University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 50

Number 2

Article 5

2020

Recent Developments: Credible Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Johnson
Hannah Williams

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Williams, Hannah (2020) "Recent Developments: Credible Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Johnson," University of
Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 50 : No. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol50/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact hmorrell@ubalt.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENT
CREDIBLE BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, INC. V. JOHNSON: UNDER
THE PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION, THE TERMS
OF A PROMISSORY NOTE REQUIRED REPAYMENT OF A LOAN
WHEN AN EMPLOYEE QUITS OR WHEN AN EMPLOYEE IS
FIRED.
By: Hannah Williams
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, pursuant to Maryland Rule
7-113(f), the circuit court may only set aside factual determinations upon
clear error and should review legal conclusions de novo. Credible Behavioral
Health, Inc. v. Johnson, 466 Md. 380, 389-99, 220 A.3d 303, 307-14 (2019).
Accordingly, the circuit court erred in applying the clearly erroneous standard
of review to the lower court’s interpretation of the promissory note and
subsequently erred in construing the note to require loan repayment only
when an employee has quit. Id. Moreover, the court undertook a common
sense analysis of the promissory note, finding the underlying intent of the
parties unambiguous and therefore, only one interpretation of the note was
reasonable. Id. at 399, 220 A.3d at 314.
Credible Behavioral Health, Inc. (“Credible”) offered a tuition loan
repayment program to its employees who wanted to obtain certificates of
higher education. Under the program, a percentage of the loan is repaid by
the employee depending upon the amount of time he works for Credible after
completing his studies. On August 10, 2016, Emmanuel Johnson (“Mr.
Johnson”) entered into the loan repayment program, and each party
memorialized their agreement via a promissory note. The agreement outlined
the terms of repayment in proportion to the time spent at Credible and the
consequences upon an event of default. Thereafter, Credible loaned Mr.
Johnson $12,529. In December of 2017, Credible fired Mr. Johnson, who at
that time had not yet obtained his degree. Credible and Mr. Johnson
subsequently entered into a repayment plan, under which Mr. Johnson made
only one payment on February 28, 2018. After Mr. Johnson failed to make
additional payments on the loan, Credible brought an action against Mr.
Johnson seeking repayment of the debt.
The District Court for Montgomery County entered judgment in favor of
Mr. Johnson, finding that the balance of the loan became due only if Mr.
Johnson quit his employment with Credible. Subsequently, Credible
appealed the district court’s ruling. The Circuit Court for Montgomery
County affirmed the lower court’s judgment finding that the district court was
not clearly erroneous in its construal of the promissory note. Credible
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petitioned the Court of Appeals of Maryland for certiorari, which was
granted on June 7, 2019.
Two issues came before the court: (1) Did the circuit court err in reviewing
the district court’s findings for clear error rather than de novo; and (2) Did
the terms of the promissory note, construed under Maryland law of contract
interpretation, permit Credible to obtain repayment of the loan? Credible
Behav. Health, 466 Md. at 388, 220 A.3d at 307.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by delineating the
circuit court’s appropriate standard of review under Md. R. 7-113(f).
Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md. at 389, 220 A.3d at 308. The court used the
predecessors of Md. R. 7-113(f), Rule 1386, and appellate rule Md. R. 8131(c), Rule 886, to ascertain the appropriate standard. Id. at 389-90, 220
A.3d at 308. Under Md. R. 8-131(c), an appellate court will only deviate
from the judgment of the trial court if the ruling is clearly erroneous. Id. at
388, 220 A.3d at 307. Like Md. R. 7-113(f), this rule does not explicitly state
the standard of review applicable to legal conclusions; however, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that the standard of appellate review over a lower
court’s legal conclusions is de novo. Id. Md. R. 8-131(c)’s predecessor, R.
886, contained language identical to that of R. 1386, and in Ryan v. Thurston,
the Court of Appeals analogized R. 1386 and R. 886 to determine the
appropriate standard of review. Id. at 390, 220 A.3d at 308 (citing Ryan v.
Thurston, 276 Md. 390, 391-92 (1975)). The Court of Appeals of Maryland
affirmed the symmetrical method of analysis in Ryan, distinguishing that the
clearly erroneous standard applies to factual determinations and legal
conclusions are reviewed de novo. Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md. at 39091, 220 A.3d at 308-09.
Next, the court swiftly determined that interpretation of the promissory
note was a legal conclusion, in line with its consistent position that contract
interpretation is a question of law. Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md. at 392,
220 A.3d at 309.
Finally, the court discussed the possible interpretations of the note.
Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md. 393, 220 A.3d at 310. Maryland courts
regularly endorse an objective approach to contract interpretation, designed
to discover the parties’ intentions by considering the context and plain
language of the provisions. Id. at 394, 220 A.3d at 310-11. If a reasonable
person could assign multiple meanings to a contract term, that term is
ambiguous in the eyes of the court, and external evidence is permitted to
establish the parties’ intentions. Id. at 394, 220 A.3d at 311. Here, the
contested contract term was “terminate.” Id. Using Webster’s Dictionary as
a reference, the court found that loan repayment was “conditioned upon” the
cessation of employment with Credible. Id. at 395, 220 A.3d at 311.
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As a foundational tenet, the court stressed the importance of applying
common sense when construing contracts. Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md.
at 397, 220 A.3d at 313. With this theory in mind, requiring loan repayment
only when an employee quits undermines an objective, common sense
approach in two ways. Id. First, interpreting the note this way leads to the
unequal treatment of employees dependent upon whether they were fired
from Credible or whether they quit. Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md. at 398,
220 A.3d at 313. If the rationale of the lower courts prevailed, an employee
who was fired from Credible would not have to repay their obligations, while
an employee who quit would. Id. This disparity has no foundation in contract
interpretation and runs afoul to the tenets of common sense. Id.
Second, the plain language of Paragraph 4(c) of the promissory note, the
“Drop/Fail Repayment” clause, set out the events that constitute default and
commencement of repayment. Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md. at 398, 220
A.3d at 313. The court explained that under Mr. Johnson’s interpretation of
the note, an employee who expects to fail a class, a default event under
Paragraph 4(c), could purposefully misbehave and induce Credible to
terminate his employment before the class ends. Id. In that situation, an
employee could act “unilaterally” to bypass the Drop/Fail clause and evade
loan repayment. Id. Thus, the court determined that this scenario also
offends the theory of common sense because it results in the disparate
treatment of employees based upon the reason for employment cessation. Id.
Therefore, Credible’s interpretation of the promissory note was the only
construal compliant with the doctrine of common sense. Credible Behav.
Health, 466 Md. at 399, 220 A.3d at 314. Interpreting the note to require loan
repayment when an employee quit or is fired permits harmonization between
the provisions stipulating the remaining loan balance and the events leading
to default. Id. The court’s view of the promissory note manifests that the
parties intended the loan to be repaid when an employee is fired or quits. Id.
In Credible Behavioral Health, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirms
longstanding principles of contract interpretation based on objectivity and
common sense. Maryland circuit courts are provided with a comprehensive
and historical analysis of the rules under which the appropriate standard of
review should be selected. Analogizing the circuit court’s and appellate
court’s rules should clarify subsequent questions on the matter and taper the
amount of error in cases to come. Moreover, businesses who are interested
in implementing a similar type of loan repayment program now have the full
weight of the Court of Appeals of Maryland behind them, should an issue
involving termination and repayment arise. On the other hand, Maryland
employees who opt into a similar program are on notice of the potential
outcome should an issue of contract interpretation arise with similar plain
language and context.

